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THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST: AN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PROGRAM

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If the history of the past is to be the prophet of the future, any discussion of the policy of the United States in the Pacific would be purely academic, as heretofore there has been no continuity of action in any direction and only occasional or spasmodic efforts to show what policy was favored by our country. But the growth of our manufactures has been so rapid that the demand for outside markets is becoming increasingly imperative. When the minds of the great business executives are turned toward the policies of the United States, as far as they affect foreign trade, we will begin to adopt a foreign policy. It will be late in the day, but it may be hoped not too late to obtain a reasonable share in the commerce of the world.

In the struggle for the trade of those countries south of us, there would seem to be no great need of intricate diplomacy. Fair play to all, respect for the strong like Chili, and encouragement and aid for the weaker states as Nicaragua, and quiet but firm insistence on the Monroe Doctrine, including the Lodge extension, would be all that would be required of direct diplomacy. We have been frequently unfortunate in our treatment of these countries, especially the strongest, Chili. Time and again she has been unnecessarily offended by our improper actions. Nearly all South American and Central American countries believe us to be individually honest, but diplomatically unsound. First Mr. Root and now Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Bacon have helped to smooth our way. A continuous policy with trained diplomats to push it and we would soon be recognized as the best friend of all Americans.

In the Far East the situation is more difficult. Here we have generally been considered the best friend of both Japan and China, but have lost the advantage of the situation by occasional diplomatic blunders. The oriental is more difficult to comprehend than our southern neighbors and is more impressed by forms and ceremonies; this with extraterritorial jurisdiction in some eastern countries, makes

the necessity for trained diplomats the more urgent. Besides the policy of a square deal, which to some extent includes the "open door," we have the Asiatic exclusion policy to complicate our diplomatic efforts. This latter difficulty may be lessened if not overcome as we gradually turn against harboring the scum of Europe, and such exclusion acts can be drawn as not to hurt the *amour propre* of the Asiatic races.

Even with trained diplomats and a continuous policy we cannot expect a fair share of the Pacific trade without American ships and American banks. The establishment of banks is necessary to furnish reasonable accommodations to our merchants; and as long as we depend on foreign ships to carry our goods we must expect foreign manufactures to take first place.

The completion of the Panama Canal will not only stimulate trade in the Pacific and add to our natural advantages for the distribution of our goods, but it will also put us in a stronger military position and therefore will make us better able to reinforce our diplomatic efforts. Poor diplomacy may prevent the success of strongly supported policies, but the best diplomacy is futile unless duly supported by naval and military power. All history supports this statement, although there is a tendency to ignore the teachings of history both ancient and modern and to put trust in unregenerated human nature.

Our occasional policy in the Far East is a fair illustration of the use of military power.

Commodore Perry's diplomacy, when Japan was opened to the countries of the world, was backed by a strong show of force for those days. In later days, although in the opening of Korea Commodore Shufeldt was aided by the Japanese, it was known that our fleet was behind him, and they had had a taste of our fleet under Admiral John Rodgers at Chemulpho some years before. Even as late as our declaration of the open door there was considerable power behind the policy. We had shortly before acquired the Philippines and we had large military and naval forces in Asiatic waters.

To strengthen our policies and to defend our coasts we have three strong home bases on the Pacific: Panama, San Francisco and Bremerton. We are forming a strong base in the Hawaiian Islands, and it is to be hoped that Guam will soon be strongly fortified. Now in holding the Philippines we are an Asiatic power and our position in all eastern affairs is much stronger for this, provided we hold them

strongly. But because of their distance from our coast, the Philippines as now held are a source of weakness in case of trouble with Japan. The proximity of that country to the Philippines, with her great military strength, would enable her to throw a large force into the islands before our fleet could arrive. It is extremely unlikely that we will ever maintain a sufficient force of our own army in the islands to ensure their security until the arrival of the fleet. A territorial army seems to me to be the solution of the problem. We have the example of the British in India, and by a continuous flow of short-time men through the territorial army, with a liberal supply of our own officers and non-commissional officers, a powerful force for defense could be soon created. This territorial army would be a valuable part of our educational system in the Philippines and nothing could be better adapted to fit the native races for self-government than a short term of military training. Our Porto Rican regiment and the Philippine scouts form excellent examples. The expense of such an army would not be great as the young men under training would not have reached the self-supporting age and it would only be a question of bookkeeping whether they were supported in idleness by their families or under arms by the government. With the Philippines strongly held our voice for good would be potent in the East.

We need the friendship of all our southern neighbors as an aid to the defense of our country for we need the support of the strong and the acquiescence of the weak in the Monroe Doctrine; but we need all the factors mentioned, American shipping, American banks, a continuous policy urged by trained diplomats backed by adequate force, if we are to obtain our just and necessary share of the trade of the Pacific. Even now our manufactories can seldom run full time, our home markets are glutted and we must reach out for a share of the world's trade if we would have contented workmen and prosperous merchants.